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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction

is

conferred

upon

this

Court

by

Utah

Code

to

their

Annotated § 78-2a-3(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Should

Plaintiffs'

brief

be

dismissed

due

failure to cite the trial court record as required by Rule 24,
URAP?

Where an appellant fails to make a concise statement of the

facts and citation of the pages in the record where those facts are
supported the court will assume the correctness of the judgment
below.

Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of California. 746 P.2d 1182,

1184 (Utah App. 1987).
2.

Can

a challenge

to the

constitutionality

statute be raised for the first time on appeal?

of

a Utah

The general rule

in Utah is that issues not raised in the trial court cannot be
raised on appeal.
3.

State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah App. 1996) .

Can a challenge be made to the apportionment of fault on

a special verdict form when the jury finds no fault; particularly
in light of case precedent on the issue noting that no challenge
can be made under such circumstances?

A challenge to the inclusion

of a nonparty on the special verdict form will not be addressed on
appeal where the jury finds no negligence and never reaches the
1

question of apportionment.

Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 1026

(Utah 1994).
4.

Can Plaintiffs challenge the special verdict form without

evidence in the record that the issue was preserved before the
trial court?

In the absence of a complete record, it is assumed

that the proceedings in the trial court were regular and proper.
Turner v. Nelson. 872 P.2d 1021, 1024-1025 (Utah 1994).
5.

Is Section 78-27-38, U.C.A., constitutional?

Based on

the holdings referenced in Issues 1, 2,3 and 4 above, Koulis v.
Standard Oil Co. of California. 746 P.2d 1182, 1184

(Utah App.

1987), State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah App. 1996) and Turner
v. Nelson. 872 P.2d 1021, 1024-1025 (Utah 1994), this issue should
not be addressed on the merits.
6.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion when, pursuant

to Rule 4 03, URE, as set forth in Defendant's Motion in Limine
prior

to

trial,

it

excluded

evidence

offered

by

Plaintiffs

regarding the revocation of Defendant's dental license about one
year after Defendant last treated Plaintiffs' decedent and regarding

alleged

observations

treatment of the decedent.

by

a dental

assistant

subsequent

to

A trial court's ruling regarding the

admissibility of evidence under Rule 4 03 will not be overturned
2

unless it was an abuse of discretion.

State v. White, 880 P.2d 18

(Utah App. 1994) . Appraisal of the probative and prejudicial value
of evidence under Rule 4 03 is generally entrusted to the sound
discretion of the trial judge and will not be upset on appeal
absent manifest error.

State v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822 (Utah App.

1991) .
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-27-38, 78-27-39 and 78-27-40; Rules
403 and 609, Utah Rules of Evidence (Attached as Addendum " A " ) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal arises from a jury verdict in a dental malpractice
action in favor of the Defendant. (R. at 692-693).

Plaintiffs7

claims were in the form of a wrongful death action alleging that
Defendant's dental treatment was negligent and caused bacterial
endocarditis

which

("Decedent").
seeking

to

caused

the

death

of

Plaintiffs'

Decedent

Prior to trial, Defendant filed a Motion in Limine

exclude

all

evidence

regarding

the

revocation

of

Defendant's dental license, which occurred about one year after
Defendant last treated the Decedent, and to exclude all evidence
regarding

alleged

observations

by

a

subsequent to treatment of the decedent.
3

former

dental

assistant

(R. at 339-347, 675). The

court granted Defendant's Motion. (R. at 675) . The court, however,
did

allow

the

jury

to

hear

evidence

of

Defendant's

criminal

convictions for fraud.
Following a seven-day jury trial, the jury returned a verdict
of no cause of action in favor of defendant.
693).

(R. at 614-617, 692-

The jury found, pursuant to the Special Verdict Form, that

Defendant was not negligent.

(R. at 614-617).

Since the jury

found no negligence on the part of the Defendant, it was not
required to answer the remaining questions on the Special Verdict
form.

Following the verdict, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for New

Trial, alleging that the granting of Defendant's Motion in Limine
was in error.

(R. at 644). Plaintiffs' Motion was denied.

(R. at

682-690).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiffs'

decedent,

congenital heart disease.

Randy

Wilson,

suffered

from

In 1959 he underwent surgery for aortic

coarctation (malformation or deformity of the aorta).

In 1986 he

underwent surgery for an aortic aneurysm and had his aortic valve
replaced with a pericardial tissue valve.

(R. at 346).

2.

Defendant,

Dr.

Day,

provided

dental

treatment

to

Mr. Wilson on several occasions from December 1986 through April
1991.

(R. at 346).
3.

In October 1989 Mr. Wilson was diagnosed with bacterial

endocarditis

(infection of the pericardial valve).

(R. at 346,

356) .
4.

In March

1992, Mr. Wilson was

bacterial endocarditis.
5.

again

diagnosed

with

(R. at 346).

In May 1992, Mr. Wilson was diagnosed a third time with

bacterial endocarditis. (R. at 346, 356).
6.

In

July

1993,

Mr.

Wilson

replacement of his aortic valve.
7.

Following

experienced

a

his

seizure,

underwent

surgery

for

(R. at 346, 356).

surgery

in

followed

by

July
cardiac

1993,

Mr.

arrest,

aspiration pneumonia and finally death on July 19, 1993.

Wilson
probable
(R. at

286-288, 346, 356).
8.

Plaintiffs

brought

a

wrongful

death

action

against

Defendant alleging that Defendant's dental treatment was negligent
and caused bacterial endocarditis which caused the death of the
decedent.

(R. at 675).

5

9.

Prior

to

trial, Defendant

filed

a Motion

in Limine

seeking to exclude all evidence offered by Plaintiffs regarding the
revocation of Defendant's dental license, which occurred about one
year after Defendant last treated Mr. Wilson, and to exclude all
evidence

regarding

alleged

observations

by a dental

subsequent to treatment of Plaintiffs' decedent.

assistant

(R. at 339-347,

675) .
10.

The trial court granted defendant's Motion in Limine,

ordering that Plaintiffs be precluded from introducing the aforementioned evidence.
11.

Following

(R. at 675).
a

seven-day

. c
jury

trial,

the

matter

submitted to the jury by way of a Special Verdict Form.

was

(R. at

613-617).
• 12... Included on the special verdict

form was a question

regarding the potential fault of Dr. Dennis Dobson, a non-party
dentist who had provided treatment to the decedent.
13.

On June 25, 1996, a verdict was returned by the jury in

favor of the Defendant.
14.

(R. at 616).

The

Special

(R. at 613-617)
Verdict

Form

signed

by

the

foreperson

establishes that the only question answered by the jury was the
first question; whether the Defendant was negligent.

6

Since this

was answered in the negative by the jury, the remaining questions,
including the questions pertaining to Dr. Dobson care, were not
addressed.
15.

(R. at 613-617; 692-693).
Following the jury verdict, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for

New Trial with supporting Memorandum.
16.

(R. at 644-652) .

The sole basis for Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial was

the assertion that the Division of Licensing's investigative report
should

have

been

admitted

as

evidence

of

habit

or practice,

pursuant to Rule 4 06, URE, and that the trial court erred by
excluding such evidence.
special verdict form.
17.

No issue was raised with regard to the

(R. at 646-652).

On or about December 6, 1996, the trial court denied

Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial, finding, as it did at trial, that
the prejudicial nature of the report of the Division of Licensing
and

the

observations

of

Defendant's

former

outweighed the probative value of the evidence.

dental

assistant

(R. at 682-687).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Plaintiffs' brief fails to provide a single citation to

the record in the Statement of the Case, the Statement of Facts, or
the Summary of Argument.

Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure requires that an appellate brief contain a statement of

7

the facts of the case "supported by citations to the record."
Court,

and

appellant

the

Utah

Supreme

Court,

fails to make a concise

have

held

statement

that

This

where

an

of the facts and

citation of the pages in the record where those facts are supported
the

court will

assume

the correctness

of

the

judgment

below.

Fackrell v. Fackrell. 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 1987); Phillips v.
Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Utah App. 1995) (citing Koulis v.
Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah App. 1987)).

Due to

Plaintiffs' failure to comply with Rule 24 in this instance, their
brief should be disregarded.
2.

The general rule in Utah is that issues which are not

raised below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

In

this instance, Plaintiffs' brief challenges the constitutionality
of Section 78-27-38, U.C.A.

No such challenge was raised at any

time, however, before the trial court.

Thus, Plaintiffs' failure

to raise their constitutional objection before the trial court
precludes them from raising it on appeal. Accordingly, Plaintiffs'
challenge

to Section

78-27-38

should not be addressed

on the

merits.
3.
resulting

Plaintiffs assert on appeal that they suffered injury
from the allegedly unconstitutional

8

apportionment of

fault to a nonparty, Dr. Dobson, even though the jury found no
negligence and never reached the question of apportionment
fault.

of

The Utah Supreme Court addressed this exact question in

1994, holding that where the jury found no legal negligence, and
therefore never reached the special verdict form, there was no
prejudice to the plaintiff at trial and the error, if any, was
harmless.
4.

Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 1026 (Utah 1994).
Plaintiffs' brief fails to set forth any citation to the

record below which establishes that they objected to the inclusion
of Dr. Dobson on the special verdict form.
complete record,

In the absence of a

specifically of evidence that this issue was

preserved below, it is assumed that the proceedings in the trial
court were regular and proper.
1024-1025 (Utah 1994).

Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021,

Accordingly, Plaintiffs' failure to estab-

lish that an objection to the special verdict form was raised and
preserved in the trial court requires that the decision below be
affirmed.
5.

Based on the holdings referred to above in Koulis v.

Standard Oil Co. of California. 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah App. 1987),
State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996) and Turner v. Nelson,
872 P. 2d 1021 (Utah 1994), Defendant asserts this issue should not

9

be addressed on the merits.

In the event it is addressed on the

merits, Plaintiffs fail to set forth any authority or persuasive
argument which overcomes the presumption of constitutionality that
is granted to legislative enactments in Utah.

The decisions of

this Court and the Utah Supreme Court pertaining to apportionment
of fault under the Utah Comparative Fault statutes establish that
the inclusion of a nonparty on a verdict form is not a constitutional violation.

National Service Industries, Inc. v. B.W.

Norton Manufacturing Company, Inc., 937 P.2d 551 (Utah App. 1997);
Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah, 853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993) .
6.

Plaintiffs' brief sets forth three separate arguments

which challenge the trial court's ruling regarding the admissibility of evidence and the application of Rule 403 to the evidence.
Plaintiffs initially assert that the trial court was mandated by
Rule 609, URE, to admit into evidence the report of the Division of
Licensing pertaining to its investigation into Dr. Day's dental
practice.
Rule 609 pertains to evidence of

the "conviction of a crime."

The Division of Licensing is a State Administrative Agency which
has no authority to convict individuals of crimes or impose any
criminal punishment whatsoever.

Accordingly, none of the findings

10

or

conclusions

reached

by

the

Division

as

a

result

of

its

investigation of Dr. Day fall within the provisions of Rule 609.
Further, Plaintiffs' argument that the report should have been
admitted pursuant to Rule 609 also fails because they cite nothing
in the record indicating that this issue was raised before the
trial court.
Plaintiffs' second argument pertaining to the trial court's
Rule 403 decision is that error was committed because the trial
court excluded
Defendant.

the testimony of a former dental

assistant of

Plaintiffs' brief sets forth no authority or rationale

for their position that the trial court erred other than their
unsupported belief that the information should have been admitted.
As noted, Defendant filed a Motion in Limine prior to trial to
exclude

the testimony

of Defendant's

former dental assistant.

Defendant's Motion was based on the grounds that the proffered
testimony was not relevant, was not evidence of habit under Rule
406, and pursuant to Rule 403, was inadmissable because of its
propensity

to mislead,

confuse

and

create

an undue

exceeding the probative value of such evidence.

prejudice

Of particular

importance was the fact that the evidence Plaintiffs sought to

11

admit concerned matters which occurred subsequent to the time of
Decedent's alleged injury.
The Court heard Defendant's Motion in Limine before trial
commenced, but deferred ruling until well into the trial, after
reviewing

the

proffered

Plaintiffs' arguments.

evidence

and

after

hearing

all

of

The Court, after careful consideration and

thorough arguments outside the presence of the jury, expressly
found

that

the probative value of the proffered

substantially

outweighed

by

the

danger

of

confusion of issues or misleading the jury.

evidence

unfair

was

prejudice,

Accordingly, the Court

properly exercised its discretion under Rule 4 03 and excluded the
evidence.
Finally, Plaintiffs' assertion that the trial court did not
use the proper analysis when evaluating the Rule 4 03 issue is
without merit.

The transcript from the proceedings clearly estab-

lishes that the trial court undertook the proper analysis when
evaluating appellants' attempts to interject evidence pertaining to
the Division of Licensing investigation.

Further, similar argu-

ments have been rejected by this Court, holding that whether the
trial

court

employs

the precise

language

of Rule

4 03

is not

dispositive of whether the ruling will be affirmed on appeal.

12

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH RULE 24,
URAP, BY FAILING TO CITE TO THE TRIAL COURT
RECORD. ACCORDINGLY, THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION IS ASSUMED TO BE CORRECT AND PLAINTIFFS'
APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED.
Rule 24(a) (7) and (e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
requires that an appellate brief contain a statement of the facts
of the case

"supported by citations to the record."

In that

regard, this Court has held that failure to comply with Rule 24 by
not citing to the record will result in the brief being disregarded
and the action of the trial court being affirmed.

In Koulis v.

Standard Oil Co. of California, 746 P.2d 1182, 1184

(Utah App.

1987) , this Court held that where an appellant "fails to make a
concise statement of the facts and citation of the pages in the
record where those facts are supported the court will assume the
correctness of the judgment below.
omitted).

Id. (emphasis added) (citations

In reaching its decision in Koulis the Court reviewed

the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 24 of the appellate rules,
finding it particularly instructive as to the intent of the rule:
Inadequate appellate briefs, which do not significantly assist the court in disposing of the case
before it, have proved to be a significant problem.
In order to alleviate this concern, this rule
13

clearly specifies the required contents and order of
each brief . . .

Paragraph (a)(7).
This paragraph requires all
statements of proceedings and facts to be supported
by references to the record. The prior rule
contained a similar requirement, but was frequently
disregarded in practice. This rule is intended to
emphasize that such citations are required in all
cases, (emphasis added).

IdFurther, Rule 24 (j), URAP, provides that briefs which are not
in compliance with these minimum standards of adequacy may be
disregarded.
held

xx

In interpreting the rule, the Utah Supreme Court has

[I] f counsel on appeal does not provide adequate citations to

the record, the judgment of the lower court is presumed to be
correct."

Fackrell v. Fackrell. 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 1987).

In a more recent case, this Court reiterated that it will "assume
the correctness of the judgment below if the appellant fails to
make a 'concise statement of the facts and citation of the pages in
the record where those facts are supported.'" Phillips v. Hatfield,
904 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Utah App. 1995) (citing Koulis v. Standard Oil
Co.. 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah App. 1987)).
In this instance, Plaintiffs' brief does not provide a single
citation to the record in the Statement of the Case, the Statement
14

of

Facts,

or

the

Summary

of

Argument.

Based

on

the

above

authority, and due to Plaintiffs' failure to comply with Rule 24,
Plaintiffs' brief must be disregarded.

Accordingly, this Court

should assume the correctness of the judgment below.

POINT II
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO RAISE THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND
ARE THEREFORE BARRED FROM RAISING IT ON
APPEAL.
The general rule in Utah is that issues not raised in the
trial court cannot be raised on appeal.
5,

7

(Utah App.

1996) .

In this

State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d

instance, Plaintiffs' brief

challenges the constitutionality of Section 78-27-38, U.C.A., which
allows the fact finder to allocate fault to a non-party.
challenge

was

raised

at

any

time

before

the

trial

No such
court.

Plaintiffs' failure to raise their constitutional objection before
the

trial

court

precludes

them

from

raising

it

on

appeal.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs7 challenge to Section 78-27-38 should not
be addressed on the merits but should be dismissed.
Defendant acknowledges there are three exceptions to the above
general rule which have been recognized in Utah (although Plaintiffs' brief makes no attempt to assert that any are present in

15

this instance).

First, an appellate court may address an issue not

raised below if the appellant establishes that the trial court
committed plain error.

Id. (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,

1208-09

Second, an appellate court may address a

(Utah 1993)).

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised on appeal which
was

not

raised

below because

of

the

claimed

ineffectiveness.

Irwin, 924 P.2d at 7 (citing State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027,
1029 (Utah 1991)).

Third, an appellate court may address an issue

not raised below if the court finds "exceptional circumstances."
Irwin, 924 P.2d at 7 (citing State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922
(Utah App. 1991)).
Plaintiffs' brief makes no argument for an exception to the
rule, indeed does not even mention that a constitutional challenge
cannot normally be raised for the first time on appeal.

Of the

three possible exceptions, two may be summarily disposed of.
is

no

argument

for

ineffective

assistance

of

counsel

There
when

challenging the constitutionality of a statute, and the argument
here is not one of plain error in interpretation or application,
rather that the statute itself is unconstitutional.

Therefore, the

only possible basis upon which an exception to the general rule
could rest is that of exceptional circumstances.
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Reiterating that

appellant made no argument that exceptional circumstances exist in
this

case,

appellee

nevertheless

addresses

the

issue

in

the

interest of a thorough reply.
The exceptional circumstances doctrine has no precise definition.

Irwin, 924 P.2d at 8 (concept of exceptional circumstances

"is an elusive one"); see also Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209, n.3 (the
exceptional circumstances exception is
Supreme

Court

constitutional

has
issue

recognized

111-12

(Utah 1963) .

ill-def ined") .

"authority

for the first

appellant's liberty is at stake.

xx

for

The Utah

raising

time on appeal" where

a
the

In re Woodward, 384 P. 2d 110,

In that case, appellant argued that a Utah

statute granting control over the juvenile courts and judges to the
executive branch was an unconstitutional violation of separation of
powers.

Id. at 113.

Although the Court did not find a liberty

interest implicated, it chose to reach the merits of the
tutional

challenge

because

there was no

juvenile proceedings at that time.

adversary

consti-

process

in

Id. at 111-112, n.2.

The concept of exceptional circumstances has consistently been
discussed in the context of
criminal cases.
(Utah 1990)

deprivation of personal liberty in

See e.g. State v. Jameson. 800 P.2d 798, 802-03

(defendant permitted
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to raise an issue of

double

jeopardy on appeal because his personal liberty was at stake).
However, this Court has underscored the extraordinary nature of
this exception in expressly rejecting even the implication of a
liberty interest as a "self-standing exception to the general rule"
against raising constitutional issues for the first time on appeal,
or as an exceptional circumstance per se.

Irwin. 924 P. 2d at 9

(citing State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920, 925 (Utah App. 1991);
see also State v. Lopez. 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994) (expressly
approving the Archambeau analysis).
This Court has explicitly held that the doctrine should only
be used for "truly exceptional situations," those in which there
are "rare procedural anomalies."

Irwin, 924 P.2d at 11 (quoting

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n.3 (Utah 1993)).
In

1995, Utah's

murder

statute, Utah

Code Ann.

§ 76-5-

203(1) (c) (1995) was challenged as being in violation of the United
States and Utah Constitutions.
700 (Utah App. 1995) .

State v. Blubaugh, 904 P. 2d 688,

The defendant did not challenge the con-

stitutionality of the statute at trial, but attempted to raise the
issue for the first time on appeal.

Id.

The court held that it

need not reach the claim because there was no argument of plain
error or exceptional circumstances on appeal.
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Id. at 701.

Thus,

even in a criminal case where the deprivation of personal liberty
occurred under the murder statute, the court has insisted on an
affirmative showing of exceptional circumstances.
Plaintiffs' failure to raise a constitutional objection in a
civil trial does not rise to the level of rare procedural anomaly
established as the standard for exceptional circumstances in Utah.
Thus, assuming Plaintiffs had even attempted to assert there were
circumstances which would allow them to raise an issue for the
first time on appeal, the facts do not support a deviation from the
general rule that you cannot raise a constitutional challenge for
the first time on appeal.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs' constitutional

challenge should not be addressed on the merits but should be
dismissed.

POINT III
EXISTING PRECEDENT IN UTAH ESTABLISHES THAT A
CHALLENGE TO THE ADDITION OF A NONPARTY ON THE
VERDICT FORM WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL
WHEN A JURY FINDS NO FAULT ON THE PART OF THE
DEFENDANT AND NEVER APPORTIONS ANY FAULT.
Plaintiffs
resulting

assert

on

appeal

that

they

from the allegedly unconstitutional

suffered

injury

apportionment

of

fault to a nonparty, Dr. Dobson, even though the jury found no
negligence and never reached the question of apportionment of
19

fault.
1994,

The Utah Supreme Court addressed this exact question in
however,

holding

that

where

the

jury

found

no

legal

negligence, and therefore never reached the special verdict form,
there was no prejudice to the plaintiff at trial.
Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 1026 (Utah 1994).

Turner v.

In Turner, the plaintiff

argued on appeal that the intent of the Utah Liability Reform Act
and the statutory scheme was that the non-party be added as a party
before being included on the special verdict form.

Id.

however,

negligent

determined

that

the

defendant

was

not

therefore never reached the issue of apportionment.

Id.

The jury,

The Court

found, in relevant part:
The jury determined that Nelson was not negligent.
For that reason, the jury never reached the issue of
whether Turner herself or Salt Lake City was negligent, and the jury never apportioned fault between
the parties. Turner simply has not provided this
court with a cogent theory of how Salt Lake City's
inclusion on a portion of the special verdict form
that the jury never reached altered the facts, the
presentation of those facts, or the result in this
case.

The jury determined that Nelson was not legally
negligent. Turner has failed to demonstrate how the
City's presence on a portion of the special verdict
form that was not completed by the jury prejudiced
her case.
The error, if any, was harmless.
We
affirm the trial court.
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and

The

facts

in

this

instance

are

essentially

identical.

Plaintiffs assert prejudice by the inclusion of Dr. Dobson on the
special verdict form, yet the jury found Defendant not negligent,
and

never

reached

apportionment

on the

special

verdict

form.

Accordingly, Turner is the controlling case precedent on this issue
and dispositive of Plaintiffs' claims.
Plaintiffs' brief not only fails to distinguish Turner but it
makes absolutely no reference to the case, despite the fact that it
is directly on point.

As a consequence, no argument is set forth

to explain why binding precedent from the Utah Supreme Court should
not be followed.

Therefore, the decision of the jury below must be

affirmed and the question of the constitutionality of Section 7827-38 should not be reached.

POINT IV
PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO CITE TO THE RECORD
TO ESTABLISH THAT THEY OBJECTED BELOW TO THE
INCLUSION OF DR. DOBSON ON THE VERDICT FORM.
Plaintiffs' brief fails to set forth any citation to the
record below which establishes that they objected to the inclusion
of Dr. Dobson on the verdict form.

This Court, as well as the Utah

Supreme Court, have noted that in the absence of a complete record,
it is assumed that the proceedings in the trial court were regular
21

and proper.
1994).

Turner v. Nelson. 872 P.2d

Accordingly,

1021, 1024-1025

(Utah

Plaintiffs' failure to establish that an

objection to the special verdict form was raised and preserved in
the trial court requires that the decision below be affirmed.

POINT V
PLAINTIFFS' CHALLENGE TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF SECTION 78-27-38 IS WITHOUT MERIT.
In light of the preceding arguments, Defendant believes that
Plaintiffs' challenge to the constitutionality of Section 78-27-38,
U.C.A., should not be addressed by this Court.

In the event the

Court does address the merits of Plaintiffs' challenge, Defendant
will briefly address why Plaintiffs' challenge is without merit. ^
As noted by this Court and the Supreme Court, principles of
judicial restraint must govern state constitutional challenges.

In

assessing the constitutionality of legislative enactments in Utah,
such as Section 78-27-38, Utah courts adhere to and apply several
general

principles.

Initially,

Utah

courts

recognize

that

a

legislative act is presumed to be constitutional and every reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of constitutionality.

Ryan v.

Gold Cross Services, Inc.. 903 P.2d 423, 424 (Utah 1995).
over,

the

presumption

requires
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a

court

to

presume

More-

that

the

classification was intended to further the legislative purpose,
Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 580 (Utah 1993).

Finally, a statute

should be held valid unless there is a clear, complete and unmistakable violation of that constitutional provision.

Id.

The

constitutional challenge to Section 78-27-38 made in this instance
should be evaluated in light of the above general principles.
In 1986, the Utah Legislature passed the Liability Reform Act
and abolished joint and several liability.

As recently noted by

this Court, one of the primary driving forces behind the passage of
the Liability Reform Act was "basic fairness."

National Service

Industries, Inc. v. B.W. Norton Manufacturing Company, Inc., 937
P.2d 551, 555 (Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs' challenge to Section 78-27-38 in this instance
fails to set forth any authority to support their position, with
the exception of one case from Montana.

Utah's Comparative Fault

statutes, however, are modeled after the Wisconsin statutes and the
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin has held that it is proper to include
non-parties on the verdict form when apportioning fault.
Trecker. 535 N.W.2d 57, 61 (Wis. App. 1995).

Martz v.

Further, the Utah

Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion regarding the need for
including all tortfeasors, whether or not they are parties, when

*
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attempting to apportion fault.

Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of

Utah, 853 P.2d 877, 879-880, 882 (Utah 1993).

As support for its

analysis in Sullivan, the Court set forth an appendix of those
cases from the Pacific Reporter which allowed the apportionment of
nonparty fault in negligence actions.

Id. at 884.

Although no constitutional challenges were brought

in the

Sullivan or National Service Industries cases, the analysis set
forth

in

the

two

cases

regarding

the

Utah

Comparative

Fault

statutes establish that the inclusion of a nonparty on a verdict
form is not a constitutional violation.

This is further supported

by the Wisconsin court's decision in Martz and the decisions of the
numerous

jurisdictions

set forth in the Appendix

in Sullivan.

Based on the above authority, and on the presumption of constitutionality which is accorded legislative enactments in Utah, and
on Plaintiffs' failure to set forth any basis to overcome that
presumption, Plaintiffs' challenge

to the constitutionality

Section 78-27-38 is without merit and must fail.
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POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
IN LIMINE, EXCLUDING PLAINTIFF FROM INTRODUCING INTO EVIDENCE THE REPORT OF THE
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL
LICENSING AND THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT'S
FORMER DENTAL ASSISTANT, WAS AN APPROPRIATE
EXERCISE OF THE COURT'S DISCRETION.
A.

Standard of Review—Rule 403.

Plaintiffs' brief sets forth three separate arguments which
challenge the trial court's ruling regarding the admissibility of
evidence and the application of Rule 403 to the evidence.

Due to

the fact that any ruling issued by the trial court pertaining to
Rule 403 will be reviewed under the same standard, Defendant will
briefly set forth the standard applied by Utah appellate courts
when faced with challenges to a trial court's application of Rule
403.
Rule

403

provides

" [a]lthough

relevant,

evidence

may

be

excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."

Utah R. Evid. 403.

A trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence under
Rule

4 03 will

not

be

reversed
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on

appeal

absent

an

abuse of

discretion.

State v. Troyer. 910 P.2d 1182, 1191 (Utah 1995).

In

fact, the Utah Supreme Court held in Troyer that it would not
overturn a trial court's finding that the evidence was inadmissable
under Rule 403 unless it was "beyond the limits of reasonability."
Id.

(quoting State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d

(emphasis added).

1201, 1221

(Utah 1993)

The rationale for according such deference to

the trial court is because it is in a better position to assess and
evaluate the evidence in the context of the trial.

Further, this

Court has noted that the trial court has "considerable freedom in
applying [Rule 403] to the facts, freedom to make decisions which
appellate judges might not make themselves ab initio
reverse."

but will not

State v. Blubauah, 904 P.2d 688, 699 (Utah App. 1995),

cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996) (quoting State v. Pena, 869
P.2d 932, 937-938 (Utah 1994).
The question in this instance, therefore, is whether the trial
court's decision to exclude evidence pertaining

to the inves-

tigation conducted by the Division of Licensing was "beyond the
limits of reasonability."
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Plaintiff s/ Assertion That Rule 609 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence Requires the Admission of a
Report from the Division of Licensing Is Incorrect
and Without Merit.

B.

Plaintiffs' assert that the trial court was mandated by Rule
609, URE, to admit into evidence the report of the Division of
Licensing pertaining to its investigation.

Plaintiffs' argument is

entirely without merit and, in light of the pleadings submitted by
Plaintiffs

to

the

trial

court

on

this

issue,

appears

to

be

insincere.
Rule 609 pertains to evidence of the "conviction of a crime."
The Division of Licensing is a State Administrative Agency which,
pursuant

to U.C.A.

§ 58-1-103, was created

enforce all licensing laws.

to administer

and

The Division has no authority to

convict individuals of crimes or impose any criminal punishment
whatsoever.

Accordingly, none of the findings or

conclusions

reached by the Division as a result of its investigation of Dr. Day
fall within the provisions of Rule 609.1
Prior to trial, Defendant filed a Motion in Limine seeking to
exclude all evidence of prior convictions and of the investigation

ironically, given Plaintiffs' argument, the trial court did
admit into evidence over the objection of Defendant's counsel the
fact that Defendant had been convicted of fraud in the District
Court.
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conducted

by

the

Division

of

Licensing.

(R.

at

339-347).

Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion
in Limine,

(R. at 349-357) .

Plaintiffs' memorandum argued, in

separate points, that (1) Defendant's prior fraud convictions were
admissible pursuant

to Rule

resulting

Division

from

the

609, URE, and,
of

Licensing

(2) the materials
investigation

admissible pursuant to Rule 4 06, URE, as evidence of habit.
350-355) .

were
(R. at

Accordingly, plaintiffs recognized at that time the

distinction between a criminal conviction and a licensing investigation.

As noted in footnote 1, Plaintiffs were successful in

admitting Defendant's criminal convictions for fraud.
court's

ruling on the report

from

the Division of

The trial
Licensing,

however, was that its probative value was outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice.
In addition to the fact that the Division of Licensing's
report is not evidence of the conviction of a crime, Plaintiffs'
argument that the report should have been admitted pursuant to Rule
609 also fails because they cite nothing in the record indicating
that this issue was raised before the trial court.

Since this

issue was not raised below, it cannot be raised on appeal.
v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996).
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State

As noted, Plaintiffs' argument before the trial court was that
the report was admissible as evidence of habit pursuant to Rule
406.

This was also their argument in their Motion for New Trial.

(R. at 644-652).

As is clear from the trial court's rulings on the

Motion in Limine and Motion for New Trial, the trial court was
never asked to address the claim now asserted on appeal that the
report was admissible pursuant to Rule 609.

(R. at 682-687).

Accordingly, assuming for argument purposes that there was any
merit to this argument, Plaintiffs are prohibited from raising this
issue for the first time on appeal.
Finally, Plaintiffs' assertion that they sought to use such
evidence for impeachment but were denied is inconsistent with the
trial

court's

discussion

on this

issue.

In fact, the

court

specifically stated that it would allow its use for impeachment
under the proper circumstances.
stances

arose,

however,

and

(R. at 769-770).
the

issue

of

No such circum-

whether

previously

excluded evidence could be used for impeachment was never raised.
C.

The Trial Court's Exclusion of Testimony Regarding
Alleged Observations By a Former Dental Assistant
Was an Appropriate Exercise of Discretion.

Plaintiffs' second argument under the rubric of the trial
court's Rule 403 ruling is that plain error was committed because
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the trial court excluded the testimony of a former dental assistant
of Defendant.

Plaintiffs' two-page argument on this point sets

forth no authority to support their position.

Further, Plaintiffs

incorrectly characterize the report of the Division of Licensing as
resulting in a conviction for fraud.

(See Plaintiffs' Brief at

33.)

As discussed in more detail above, the Division of Licensing

does

not

Finally,

have

the

authority

Plaintiffs' brief

to

sets

enter

criminal

forth no

convictions.

rationale

for

their

position that the trial court erred other than their unsupported
belief that the information should have been admitted.
As noted, Defendant filed a Motion in Limine prior to trial to
exclude

the

testimony

of Defendant's

former dental

assistant.

Defendant's Motion was based on the grounds that the proffered
testimony was not relevant, was not evidence of habit under Rule
406, and pursuant to Rule 403, was inadmissable because of its
propensity

to mislead,

confuse

and

create

an undue

exceeding the probative value of such evidence.

prejudice

(R. at 339-347).

Of particular importance was the fact that the evidence Plaintiffs
sought to admit concerned events which allegedly occurred subsequent to the time of Decedent's treatment.
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Furthermore, Defendant argued that evidence pertaining to the
investigation by the Division of Licensing would severely prejudice
him in presenting his defense.

(R. at 343) .

The jury would be

inclined to find on behalf of the Plaintiffs, not based on the
evidence in this case with respect to the Decedent, but based on
extraneous allegations and circumstances unrelated to the merits of
the present action.

Furthermore, the jury could become confused

about whether they were judging Dr. Day's conduct with respect to
the instant case or simply judging Dr. Day in general.
Defendant

argued

that

allowing

extraneous evidence would result

Plaintiffs

to

Finally,

introduce

in a trial about

such

Defendant's

conduct with respect to people who were not plaintiffs in the
instant action; and not about whether Plaintiffs were entitled to
recover based on the care and treatment rendered to the Decedent.
(R. at 343) .
Plaintiffs' response to Defendant's Motion argued that the
evidence was admissible pursuant to Rule 406 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, which provides:

"Evidence of the habit of a person or of

the routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated or
not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to
prove

that

the

conduct

of

the
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person

or

organization

on

a

particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine
practice."

(R. at 349-357).

The evidence which Plaintiffs sought

to admit, however, was evidence of behaviors which relate to a
period of time approximately a year after the alleged injury to the
Decedent.

Plaintiffs' Memorandum offered no authority to support

the use of Rule 406 as a basis for admitting evidence of a custom
or practice which post-dates the matter in question.
The Court heard Defendant's Motion in Limine before trial
commenced, but deferred ruling until well into the trial, after
reviewing

the

proffered

Plaintiffs' arguments.

evidence

and

after

hearing

all

of

Much of the proffered evidence would have

been inadmissible for lack of foundation, based on relevance, and
based on hearsay.
otherwise

Additionally, the proffered evidence, even if

admissible, did not establish a

"habit" or

practice" as required for admissibility under Rule 406.

"routine

Regardless

of admissibility or lack of admissibility based on other grounds,
however,

the

Court,

after

careful

consideration

and

thorough

arguments outside the presence of the jury, expressly found that
the probative value of the proffered evidence was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues
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or misleading

the

jury.

Accordingly,

based

on Rule

4 03 the

evidence was excluded.
Based on the evidence before the trial court, its decision to
exclude the testimony of Defendant's former dental assistant was in
no way "beyond the limits of reasonability."

A portion of the

trial court's rationale for excluding the testimony is set forth in
the partial transcript that is part of the record on this appeal:
I'm not going to allow you to refer to Deanna
Bailey's notes. I'm not going to allow you to refer to
the proposed exhibits that were provided to me—I believe
they were yesterday—for the same reasons. I don't find
they go to the issue of truthfulness under 608(b) that
you are entitled to cross-examine on. I think they go to
specific bad acts, evidence of other bad acts, other
conduct of the witness which the rule is designed to
exclude, and 403 is available for the court to consider
in the weighing process.
I'm trying to keep the evidence in this case on the
care and treatment or lack thereof as it relates to Randy
Wilson, and not other patients, not other cases, and keep
the trial focused in that area, Mr. Young.
(R. at 765) .
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs' challenge to
the trial court's decision must fail and the jury's decision should
be affirmed.
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D.

The Trial Court Applied
Analysis to This Matter.

the

Proper

Rule

403

Plaintiffs apparently argue that the trial court was required
to use certain language when issuing its Rule 4 03 ruling on the
Division of Licensing report; and the lack of such terminology
implies that the court's analysis was flawed and an abuse of discretion.

This very same argument, however, was recently rejected

by this court in State v. Alonzo-Nolasco. 932 P.2d 606 (Utah App.
1997).

In Alonzo-Nolasco, this Court held that whether the trial

court employs the precise language of Rule 4 03 is not dispositive
of whether the ruling will be affirmed on appeal:
Although the trial court did not provide any specific
findings regarding his exclusion of the evidence under
Rule 403, beyond asserting that the prejudice outweighed
the probative value, "we will 'affirm if we can find some
basis in the record for concluding that the trial court's
action falls within the limits of permissible discretion
under Rule 403.'" State v. Auble, 754 P.2d 935, 937 (Utah
1988)(citation omitted). Further, we can find the trial
court properly applied Rule 403 in making its decision
even though the trial court did not use the exact
language of Rule 403.
See State v. Troyer, 910 P. 2d
1182, 1191 (Utah 1995) (finding trial court employed Rule
4 03 in making its decision even though it did not
specifically term its analysis xxa Rule 403 analysis");
see also Hall v. Process Instruments & Control, Inc., 890
P.2d 1024, 1027 (Utah 1995) (stating exact language or
terminology is not conducive as to whether trial court
employed correct analysis).
Id. at 613-614.
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In this instance, the transcript of the trial court's decision
clearly establishes that it undertook the proper analysis when
evaluating appellants' attempts to interject evidence pertaining to
the Division of Licensing investigation:
The objection is sustained. You are not to refer to the
state licensing procedures, the actions of the state, or
the specific cases that were used by the state to result
in revocation of his license. I have already indicated—I
think I did in chambers, even on the record, even under
Rule 403—1 thought, and do find, that is unfairly
prejudicial in this case. It's misleading to the jury.
It would be confusing of the issues and would be trying
other issues and other cases that would be unfair in this
case.
(R. at 764) .
Given that Rule 4 03 provides "evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury," the
above passage establishes that the trial court applied the proper
Rule 4 03 analysis.

Further evidence of the trial court's proper

application of Rule 403 is set forth in its Memorandum Decision
addressing Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial, which notes that it
concluded during trial that "the danger of unfair prejudice to the
jury substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence."
(R. at 686).
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Based on the above, Plaintiffs' assertion that the trial court
did not properly assess the evidence pursuant
without merit.

to Rule 403 is

As noted, the record establishes the trial court

gave considerable analysis to the proffered evidence prior to its
exclusion.

(686, 762-770).
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing arguments and authorities, Defendant
asserts Plaintiffs have failed to set forth grounds supporting
reversal of the jury verdict entered in this matter in favor of
Defendant.

Accordingly, the jury's decision should be affirmed and

Plaintiffs' Appeal must fail.
DATED this

^ff

day of July, 1997.
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